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lone, marooned organism or mind *only*. The readjustment is always in and of a "social situation."³

Now when one fully accepts and *steadily holds on to* this notion of the social origin and function of consciousness, it ought not to be difficult to understand why for *him* the question of the possibility in general of ideas and hypotheses of a private consciousness serving as "instruments" and "guides" would not arise. From this standpoint the presumption is all the other way. The question might much more intelligently be: How ideas ever *fail* to guide? And indeed they never do fail to "guide" in *some* way. They are never absolutely impotent. They always effect *some* transformation.

This brings us around again to the problem of truth and error, which is a question not of the *complete* efficiency or impotence of ideas, but of the *kind and degree* of efficacy they have. At this point it is clear from the amount of writing which continues from the standpoint of "the private stream of consciousness" that there is need of a return to a direct discussion of the "social-situation" conception of consciousness and of its application to the judgment—especially to such extremely "realistic" instances as Professor Pratt's "toothache" case, which he seems to regard as peculiarly crucial for pragmatists. This I hope to take up in another paper.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Institutiones metaphysicæ specialis. Tomus Quartus. *Theologia naturalis*. P. STANISLAUS DE BACKER, S.J. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne & Cie. 1908. Pp. 306.

The revival of scholastic philosophy, which sprang from the Italian peninsula during the latter part of the last century, begins to receive in our country the attention to which it is so justly entitled. Courses on Thomas Aquinas are now given in our leading universities. Learned studies on neo-Thomism are made by some of our most profound thinkers, such as Brother Chrysostom and Professor Royce. Our philosophical publications give them a hearty welcome. The interest afforded us by the most recent contributions to neo-scholastic literature is thus greatly increased by this attitude of our thinking world.

The volume entitled "*Theologia naturalis*" is the fourth part of a complete course of scholastic philosophy entitled "*Institutiones metaphysicæ specialis*," the first volume of which appeared in 1899. The author, Stanislaus de Backer, born in 1851, entered the Society of Jesus

*It is worth noting that it is this "subcutaneous" psychology that has set most of the problems for ethical theory. A large part of the theory of ethics seems to consist of conceptual devices for getting around a solipsistic psychology, whether of the "soul" or of the "biological" type.

at the age of seventeen, and is now professor of special metaphysics in the Jesuit college of Louvain.

The volume may be roughly divided into three different parts: the first comprises the first two chapters and is devoted to the arguments in favor of God's existence; the second extends from Chapter III. to Chapter VIII., and studies the divine attributes; the third, which includes the remaining three chapters, is concerned with the relation of God to the world.

In neo-scholastic philosophical literature, all acceptable proofs of God's existence were generally divided into three classes. There was the argument of the first cause, also called *metaphysical* argument; the *physical* argument, derived from the manifold and beautiful order of nature; and the *moral* argument. Fr. de Backer contends that this division is verbal rather than real, because the metaphysical, as well as the physical argument, starts from the consideration of physical facts, and he concedes to the moral arguments alone the right of forming a separate class.

The author's favorite proof of God's existence is based upon the principle of causality. All beings, he says, are either beings by essence or beings by participation. A being by essence (*ens per essentiam*) has in itself the reason of its existence; a being by participation (*ens per participationem*) exists only in virtue of the causal action of some other being. If the world can be proved to be a being by participation, we shall be compelled to admit the existence of a being by essence external to the world and on which the world depends in its existence and its essence. Fr. de Backer sees in the energy possessed by material things an unquestionable proof of their contingent character. All material beings, he says, are endowed with energy. They do not possess this energy in virtue of their own essence, otherwise they would be unable to pass from one form of energy to another. They receive it, therefore, from a cause external to the world (p. 58).

Whether this argument, and the argument from motion—St. Thomas's favorite proof—upon which the author also insists, will appeal to many modern minds, I am unable to tell. Some persons seem to regard them as absolute proofs. I am sorry not to be able to share their enthusiasm. I would not assert that human reason is unable to reach a knowledge of God's existence, but might it not be questioned whether a satisfactory proof of the existence of a supreme mind has ever been formulated? Innumerable arguments for the existence of a divine being have been adduced, some altogether valueless, others well deserving our attention. But do they possess the character of absolute proof? Do they amount to anything else than a reasonable ground? And is it not more in harmony with the spirit of Christianity that it should be so? That faith is a virtue is a capital point in Christian belief; but if we were convinced by pure reason of the existence of God as we are convinced of a mathematical truth, where would be the merit of our faith?

In the part of his work dealing with the divine attributes, Fr. de Backer strongly insists upon the simplicity of the divine essence. "Quæstio, quæ hic agitanda est," says he, "respicit Deum, non ut in se

est, sed ut ab intellectu nostro ex consideratione rerum creaturarum analogice concipitur (p. 101); Deus in seipso spectatus est forma simplicissima" (p. 100).

As I have already pointed out elsewhere,¹ the charge so often brought against the old theistic writers—that they conceived the divine being as a bundle of unconnected attributes—is utterly devoid of foundation. Fr. de Backer's work is a new proof of the fact that the God of Scholasticism is no less simple, and probably no less consistent, than the absolute of the Hegelian school. The limits of this article do not allow me to make a detailed study of the divine attributes studied by Fr. de Backer. Let the reader who is interested in them peruse the learned pages of the eminent Jesuit and he will be well repaid for his labor.

It is hardly necessary to say that, in the question of physical pre-motion, Fr. de Backer sides with Molina, and condemns the Dominican doctrine as destructive of human liberty. He even contends that it makes God the cause of all sins (p. 206), a truer cause than the sinner himself (p. 207). And this dispute recalls to our minds the famous dissension between the Dominicans and the Jesuits, so ably portrayed by Pascal in his immortal "Provincial Letters." It compels us to admit that the Jesuits of to-day—in spite of the oft-recurring assertion that they differ *toto cœlo* from those of the seventeenth century—have still the same spirit as their older brethren, the same theology, nay even the same morals.

In some points bearing upon the relation of God to the world, I am inclined to differ from Fr. de Backer and from most neo-scholastics. Fr. de Backer admits with St. Thomas that human reason is unable to decide whether the world had a beginning or not. He also agrees with the Angelic Doctor in finding in Holy Scripture a proof of the real beginning of the world in time. But, unlike St. Thomas, he sometimes seems to regard creation as an act that took place in time. In his discussion of the possibility of an eternal creation he had made it perfectly clear that the priority of the creator over the creature is not a priority of duration, but a priority of nature. "*Creatio non est effectio rei post nihilum, si illud post ad durationis ordinem referatur; sed est effectio rei e nihilo. Ut res autem e nihilo fiat, satis est nihilum prioritate naturæ antecedere ejus esse*" (p. 253). But, why does he add in the next paragraph that the difference between creation and conservation lies in the fact that a thing is created in the first instant of its duration and is conserved in the remaining part of the same (p. 254)? St. Thomas is very careful to assert that creation and conservation are not two different acts, but one and the same, and that this act did not take place in time: "*est sine motu et tempore.*"² And, indeed, how can we admit that the creation of the world was a thing done once for all at a certain date, and at the same time hold that God might have created a world without a beginning in time? What would then become of creation? Is it not more consistent with the Thomistic doctrine to assert that creation and

¹ Cf. "Revival of Scholastic Philosophy," p. 134; this JOURNAL, Vol. V., pp. 178 ff.

² "Summa Theologica," I., quæst. CIV., art. 1.

conservation are two different human views of a thing which is one and the same in itself; that God creates in a perennial present a world which may or may not have existed forever?

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NEW YORK CITY.

L'ame et le cerveau. Par Docteur SURBLED, Médecin de L'Hopital Anne-Marie. Deuxième Edition, revue et augmentée. Paris, 1907.

This work is intended as an argument against materialism. It is written with the purpose, everywhere evident, of establishing the existence of the soul as an entity superior to the body and distinct from it. The author is a pronounced adherent of the doctrine of cerebral localization, and the most interesting addition that he has made in the second edition of his work is the statement that the "lobe of memory" has been discovered and that its seat is to be found in the "*lobe moyen ou temporo-parietal gauche.*" This discovery, which Surbled declares is one of the most brilliant in cerebology, was made by Professor Pierre Marie, head of the hospital at Bicêtre, who, in that capacity, had the opportunity for ten years to observe many cases of aphasia and to perform autopsies on more than half of the patients. The results of his investigation are published in the *Semaine Médicale* of May 23, 1906.

In order to establish his contention of the independence of the higher mental faculties, while at the same time holding to a thorough-going localization of cerebral functions, Dr. Surbled makes a radical separation between intelligence and sensation, placing imagination and memory in the latter category, and reason and will in the former. Reason and will are the immaterial soul, while sensation, with imagination and memory, are common to both man and brute. The objects of sensation are necessarily extended and material, while abstract thought has to do only with intangible objects. The cerebrum is essentially an organ of sensibility and of movement, but not of thought. While it is quite possible to localize the sensational elements of our mental life, it is impossible to do this for the higher intelligence.

Surbled therefore attacks with vigor the theories of Flechsig, declaring that his attempt to find the centers of association has shown itself false. These centers are, according to the statement of Flechsig, "the actual organs, or rather the actual instruments, of thought." This theory, says Surbled, is the product of imagination, "a pure romance, which is perhaps fascinating, but which has not the basis of facts." For a similar reason the author criticizes the theory of Grasset, who found two distinct levels of intelligence, the one in the inferior centers, the "polygone," the other in the superior centers "O," where reside our highest powers, intelligence and will. This theory is, according to Surbled, practically that of Flechsig—the center O being a substitute for the centers of association and the "polygone" for the centers of projection.

Surbled declares that the frontal lobes, far from being the seat of intelligence, are centers of sensibility and motor control like the rest of